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TO BETRAY ONCE? TO BETRAY TWICE?:
REFLECTIONS ON CONFIDENTIALITY, A
GUILTY CLIENT, AN INNOCENT




Congratulations are in order to the editors of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for creating a single hypothetical that so
precisely and dramatically captures the dilemma of role for each of
the three learned professions. Only the most obtuse of readers would
fail to comprehend the editors' intent. Their invitation requires much
more than a simple exegesis of professional standards. It challenges
the Symposium's essayists to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis
of professional role and personal morality or to forsake one for the
other.
Because such a difficult journey should not be undertaken alone,
I would like to expand the hypothetical by imagining that Ms.
Hopewell is a former student who has consulted me for advice. The
writing of this Essay thus becomes both a professional and personal
exercise, forcing me to explore the boundary between role and
identity. It tests the strength of my commitment to the distinction
and the wisdom of the distinction itself.
"Let me make myself clear," I would tell Ms. Hopeweil at the
beginning of our conversation, "I regard the execution of an innocent
man as immoral." "But," I would hastily add in my most professorial
voice, "it is when our passions run the highest that we should pause
for reflection." If Ms. Hopewell's hearing was extremely keen,
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Director of the Stein
Institute of Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of Law. I would like to express
my sincere appreciation to Professors Russel Pearce and Benjamin Zipursky of Fordham
University School of Law for their very helpful comments and criticisms of an earlier draft
of this essay.
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however, she might decipher the simultaneous whisperings of a more
personal voice, "Why didn't she enroll in the other section?
Whatever I advise her is likely to get both of us in trouble and in the
newspaper. The judgeship seemed so promising .... Why me?"
Because I am conservative by nature, a sympathizer of Creon as
much as an admirer of Antigone, my instinctual reaction to Ms.
Hopewell's inquiry would be to ransack the texts and history of the
professional standards of confidentiality for guidance.'
To Ms. Hopewell's plaintive response, "What if text and history
fail? What if they prove unhelpful or morally dissatisfying?" I would
retreat in grand professorial style to the fortress of "core values."2
Admittedly, I would stumble a bit, tripped by the riposte of my
personal voice, "But what if they don't fail? After all, you teach that
professional rules enhance the lawyer-client relationship precisely
because they restrain a lawyer's discretion. In their absence, clients
would have to inventory a lawyer's value system before every
engagement."
By this point in our conversation, Ms. Hopewell's character
would undoubtedly be quite evident. I imagine that she is impatient
by nature and persistent by professional training. Not surprisingly,
she remains unsatisfied. "What if there are too many core values?
What if none is clearly superior to the others?" I would undoubtedly
lapse into grand professorial silence at her questions, banishing my
own suspicion of doubt. Responding as most lawyers do to client pain
and anguish, I would pretend not to see them, anxiously hoping that
my professorial self will prescribe a solution acceptable to my
personal self.
And if it does not? My conscience does not permit me to linger
long over the response. Death is different. It is final and irreversible.
The physical and psychological accoutrements of execution are so
painful that they are hidden from view.3 Thus, I am confident of my
1. See infra part II.
2. See infra part III.
3. JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990 (1994); HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN
WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
18-21 (1993); Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of
Execution? The Engineering of Death Over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551
(1994). Capital punishment may be the only human experience not yet filmed for public
viewing. Our voyeuristic society at its best tolerates-and at its worst encourag-
es-displays of conception, birth, and death, and the publicizing of intimate family and
personal events for unrestricted consumption on television and video.
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response. The boundary between role and identity must crumble.4
My conscience will not permit confidentiality to trump justice. An
innocent man cannot be allowed to die.
There is no certainty that Ms. Hopewell's conscience and mine
will agree, however.5 I do not fear being pilloried for supporting or
encouraging Ms. Hopewell to betray her client.6 It is most unlikely
that the press, the public, or a regulatory authority will penalize my
conduct or hers. The prospect that inflicts the greatest anguish on my
conscience is the betrayal of her confidence To respect the dictates
of my conscience I must first violate her trust and afterwards her
client's. The moral damage I wreak may well injure her more than
Mr. Jones.
II. A TABULA NON RAZA: THE CONTEMPORARY
UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION REGARDING
CONFIDENTIALITY
The duty not to disclose the substance of a client's communica-
tion is probably the oldest professional responsibility known to the
legal profession. Because of its historical roots in the law of both
evidence and agency, confidentiality is traditionally analyzed as an
evidentiary privilege, for example, the attorney-client privilege, and
as an ethical obligation, for example, a duty expressed in the
professional standards adopted by a court or state bar association to
govern the conduct of lawyers admitted to practice in a particular
jurisdiction.
The attorney-client privilege has a distinguished historical lineage
and has achieved an almost mythic standing in the collective psyche
4. See infra part IV.
5. Other lawyers, after all, have accepted the moral responsibility of nondisclosure
in similar circumstances. See infra note 44.
6. Although I am hardly looking forward to it. Remember the judgeship?
7. The possibility that I will betray Ms. Hopewell and her client raises a whole host
of ethical questions that need to be addressed in a separate essay. For example, what is
the legal character of my relationship with Ms. Hopewell? If we stand in a lawyer-client
relationship, I am bound by the same ethical rule of confidentiality with respect to her
communication to me as she is with respect to Mr. Jone's communication to her. Since
my moral conviction against permitting the death of an innocent man is so strongly held,
the conflict of interest rules are likely to require me to disclose this "personal interest"
because it will effect the exercise of my independent judgement. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1969); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUct Rule 1.7(b) (1983). My failure to advise her may well constitute an independent
violation of the jurisdiction's professional standards.
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of litigants, lawyers, and judges. References to it can be found as
early as 1580 in Elizabethan Law Reports.8 Great debates have raged
about its utility and its undeniable capacity to obstruct the search for
truth. Jeremy Bentham assailed it for benefitting only the "guilty
person," and demanded "let the law adviser say everything he has
heard ... the [innocent] client cannot have anything to fear from
[disclosure]." 9 But the Supreme Court has just as ardently champi-
oned its cause,
to encourage full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients and thereby promote broader public
interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy ... depends upon the lawyer's being fully in-
formed by the client .... "The lawyer-client privilege rests
on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that
relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if
the professional mission is to be carried out."10
The privilege can be invoked only in the context of a proceeding
conducted by a court or by a legislative or administrative body in
which testimony is being taken. The facts outlined in the Sympo-
sium's hypothetical foreclose an extended discussion of the attorney-
client privilege, however, because there is no hearing in which either
Ms. Hopewell or her client, Mr. Jones, are being examined about their
communications. Of course, any disclosure is certain to lead to such
a hearing, a result that accounts for much of the analytical confusion
and muddled opinion writing in this area. Nor is there any need to
8. Dennis v. Codrington, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580). See generally 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 & n.1 (John T.
McNaughton ed., 1961) (citing cases wherein attorneys were afforded a privilege from
testifying about or otherwise revealing information obtained in their capacity as attorneys).
The leading historical analysis is Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978). The impact of the privilege has
even captured the imagination of popular entertainment. At least two episodes of the
popular television show, L.A. Law, portrayed lawyers as personally distraught by their
inability to disclose privileged information.
9. 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English
Practice, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1838-
1843).
10. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981) (quoting Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). The moral foundations of confidentiality are, of course,
more persuasive than the Supreme Court's rather utilitarian view. See, e.g., SISSELA BOK,
SECRETS (1982); Bruce M. Landesrihan, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
in THE GOOD LAWYER 191 (David Luban ed., 1984).
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discuss the limited exceptions to the privilege since none is even
arguably applicable."
The infamous Macumber1 2 case dramatically illustrates the
enormous respect accorded the privilege by the courts and society's
willingness to subordinate truth seeking "to encourage full and frank
communications between attorneys and their clients."' 3 The defen-
dant was indicted for murder 4 and risked the imposition of a death
sentence. Two attorneys were prepared to testify that their client,
now deceased, had confessed to the murder." The trial court
prohibited their testimony, concluding its admission would violate the
attorney-client privilege. 6 The Arizona Supreme Court held that
the testimony was properly excluded. Similarly, in a recent much
publicized case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to compel
an attorney to answer a grand jury's questions concerning a conversa-
tion he had with his client, a prime suspect in the grizzly murder of
his own wife and child, on the day before the client committed
11. Ms. Hopewell obviously paid close attention in her professional responsibility
course. She is 100% correct in her observation, "I'm not even supposed to tell anyone
about this conversation, so nobody would know enough to try to make either of us testify
anyway."
While there is debate about the scope and interpretation of each exception, almost'
all jurisdictions permit a lawyer to reveal otherwise protected communications (1) to prove
services rendered in an action to collect the lawyer's fee; (2) to defend against accusations
of wrongdoing; and (3) when the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime
or fraud. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1995).
No criminal penalty attaches to Mr. Jones's failure to confess to the murder. Indeed,
the "failure" is constitutionally protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Misprison of felony is not a crime in most states, and there is no general
obligation to bring wrongdoing to the attention of law enforcement authorities. Thus, Ms.
Hopewell and Mr. Jones are legally free to maintain their silence.
12. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1006 (1978). Similar fact patterns can be found in Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1032-
33 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); State v. Valdez, 618 P.2d 1234, 1235 (N.M.
1980). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Herrera did not address the privilege
issue. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Valdez refused to permit a lawyer to testify that
his client had confessed to a robbery for which the defendant had been convicted.
13. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.
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suicide. 8 Courts have honored the privilege in other notorious civil
and criminal proceedings as well.19
If any doubts linger about the unavailability of an exception to
the attorney-client privilege, a brief recounting of a heated discussion
at the 1989 meeting of the American Law Institute (ALI) will
certainly dispel them. For the past ten years, the ALI has been
laboriously drafting a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. In
that year it considered, inter alia, section 132 of Tentative Draft No.
2, a provision which the reporters represented accurately reflected the
current state of the law concerning the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege."0 The debate erupted not over section 132
but rather over proposed Illustration 4. The drafters modeled the
Illustration on the Macumber case but added the twist that the client
who confessed to -the murder was still alive. Illustration 4 thus
corresponds almost precisely to the Symposium's hypothetical. The
discussants raised multiple objections. To some, the execution of an
innocent man was a morally intolerable result and the Illustration
should have affirmatively rejected such an outcome; to others, any
departure from a rule of absolute protection for such communications
represented a slippery slope descent, leading to the ultimate disinte-
gration of the attorney-client relationship; to still others, the Illustra-
tion accurately represented the state of the law, but should have been
dropped from the Restatement or modified because of its starkness.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the members voted to delete
18. In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990). The extent
to which the privilege should be modified when the client is deceased or to accommodate
legitimate historical inquiries is a matter of debate. Simon J. Frankel, Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the Client, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (1992);
Brian R. Hood, Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6:
Permitting Limited Disclosure After the Death of the Client, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741
(1994).
19. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), affd, 359 N.E.2d
377 (N.Y. 1976) (the "buried bodies" case analyzed as an evidentiary issue); see also N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 479 (1978) (the "buried bodies" case
analyzed as an ethical, nonevidentiary privilege); D'Alessio v. Gilberg, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484
(Sup. Ct. 1994) (hit-and-run case).
In rare, isolated instances, the courts have disregarded the privilege. See, e.g., Cohen
v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (stating that under the facts of
this particular case, the interests of justice require the disclosure of the client's communi-
cations to his attorney).
20. ALl, 66TH ANNUAL MEETING, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: PROCEEDINGS
1989, at 332-441 (1990).
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Illustration 4 but left the Reporter free to seek approval for a new
draft at a future meeting, which he did not do.21
In nonevidentiary settings, it is the ethical obligation of confiden-
tiality, as expressed in each jurisdiction's professional standards
governing the conduct of lawyers, that will either permit or prohibit
the disclosure of a client's communications. This obligation is rooted
in the fiduciary duties that an agent owes to a principal. Because this
ethical obligation will determine the extent to which Ms. Hopewell
may reveal her client's confession-an issue analytically distinct from
whether she may testify to it-its history and pertinent interpretations
are explored below in limited detail.
A. A Historical Overview
At a point yet to be determined with any precision by historians
of the legal profession, lawyers, scholars, and academics acknowledged
the existence of an ethical obligation of confidentiality distinct from
the attorney-client privilege. Its historical development cannot be
traced with the same precision as that of the attorney-client privilege.
For example, George Sharswood, whose writings on legal ethics
significantly influenced the drafting of codes of lawyer conduct,
associated the duty of confidentiality with the attorney-client
privilege.22 He clearly expressed the view that a lawyer could not
reveal a client's past criminal behavior.'
Despite Sharswood's influence on the drafting process, when the
American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Canons of Professional
Ethics in 1908, it slighted confidentiality as an independent ethical
value, associating it in passing with the avoidance of conflicts of
21. Id.; see also News and Background: ALl Members Approve Part of Restatement
on Lawyers, ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT, May 24, 1989, at 158, 159
(stating that Illustration 4 was ultimately struck down by a vote of 164 to 65). For an
insider's illuminating account of the debate over Illustration 4, see Charles W. Wolfram,
Legal Ethics and the Restatement Process-The Sometimes-Uncomfortable Fit, 46 OKLA.
L. REV. 13, 19-20 (1993). The ALI subsequently considered related provisions dealing
with the ethical obligation of confidentiality. While the ALI lessened the obligation
somewhat with respect to future crimes, it did not disturb Macumber. See Fred C.
Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should
the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 912 (1993).
22. George Sharswood, An Essay on Professional Ethics, 32 A.B.A. REP. 1 (5th ed.
1907).
23. Id. at 105-07. For an insightful analysis of Sharswood's contribution to the
development of modem legal ethics, see Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican
Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241 (1992).
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interest. 4 Over the course of the next twenty years, the legal profes-
sion gradually accepted the notion of a distinct ethical obligation of
confidentiality; and when the ABA amended the Canons in 1928, it
devoted a separate Canon to it. Entitled "Confidences of a Client,"
Canon 37 affirmatively stated "[ilt is the duty of a lawyer to preserve
his client's confidences."'  The duty was not absolute, however.
Canon 37 permitted disclosure "[i]f a lawyer is [falsely] accused by his
client" of a wrongdoing or to prevent "[t]he announced intention of
a client to commit a crime."26 In the latter event the Canon permit-
ted the lawyer to "make such disclosures as may be necessary to
prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.""7
Apart from the self-defense exception, the ethical duty of confidenti-
ality as articulated in Canon 37 prevented a lawyer from revealing a
client's past wrongdoing.
Canon 37 should not be read in isolation, however. Two other
Canons suggested possible exceptions to the prohibition against
disclosure of past wrongdoing. The first was Canon 29: "The counsel
upon the trial of a cause in which perjury has been committed owe it
to the profession and to the public to bring the matter to the
knowledge of the prosecuting authorities. 2 8 The second was Canon
41. Entitled "Discovery of Imposition and Deception," it provided:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has
been practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court
or a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by
advising his client, and if his client refuses to forego the
advantage thus unjustly gained, he should promptly inform
the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take
appropriate steps.
2 9
24. Canon 6 prohibited a lawyer from accepting employment that might entail the
disclosure of a client's "secrets or confidences" and affirmed a lawyer's "obligation to
represent the client with undivided fidelity." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon
6 (1908). See generally HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS (1953) (including a general
discussion of the purpose, scope, and application of the duty of a lawyer to preserve a
client's confidences); Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its
History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1970) (referring generally to works of Henry
S. Drinker).
25. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (1928).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Canon 29.
29. Id. Canon 41.
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While the language of both provisions suggested that disclosure
trumped confidentiality at least in instances of perjury, fraud, or
deception, that interpretation was never accepted. 0 In sum, this
initial foray into the historical origins of the ethical obligation of
confidentiality clearly establishes the primacy of the principle of
nondisclosure.3
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969
by the ABA, reaffirmed that primacy. It also formalized the
distinction between the evidentiary privilege and the ethical obligation
of confidentiality. Borrowing from the language of the 1908 Canons,
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101 distinguished between a "confidence"
and a "secret."32 It defined the former as "information protected by
the attorney-client privilege under applicable law"33 and the latter as
"other information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would
be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."'
The Code's protection was hardly absolute, however. It vested a
lawyer with discretion to reveal a client's confidences or secrets to
prevent the client from committing a future crime, to collect the
lawyer's fee, and to defend against charges of wrongdoing.35 Past
crimes remained off limits, however, with one possible tortured
exception. The Model Code's DR 7-102(B) mandated the disclosure
30. E.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953);
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 268 (1945); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 869 (1965); DRINKER, supra note 24, at 137-39.
31. That Sharswood's interpretation corresponded to the actual understanding of the
bar finds tragic confirmation in the trial of Leo Frank. Frank, a Jew, was convicted of the
murder of a young woman. His arrest and conviction were the product of systemic anti-
Semitism. Another individual confessed his responsibility for the crime to his lawyer. The
lawyer concluded that he was ethically precluded from revealing his client's confession.
Frank was subsequently lynched by a mob when the governor commuted his death
sentence. See ARTHUR G. POWELL, I CAN Go HOME AGAIN 287-92 (1943); see also
Arthur G. Powell, Privilege of Counsel and Confidential Communications, 6 GA. BJ. 333
(1943) (arguing that under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments the confidential
communications between the accused and his counsel must be kept inviolate).
32. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A) (1983).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. DR 4-101(C)(3)-(4). DR 4-101(C) also permitted disclosure with the client's
consent and when permitted by the Code, or required by law or court order. Id. DR 4-
101(C)(1)-(2). Because these exceptions are irrelevant to Ms. Hopewell's dilemma, they
are not discussed.
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of a fraud perpetrated by a client on a person or tribunal.3 6 Its
force, however, was dissipated by two conditions. First, the fraud had
to occur "in the course of the representation."37  This condition
guaranteed that a client who consulted a lawyer about prior wrongful
conduct would not risk disclosure. Second, it prohibited disclosure
when "the information [about the fraud] is protected as a privileged
communication."38 Because the likelihood of learning of a client's
fraud in a nonprivileged context is extremely small, DR 7-102(B)
actually exalted confidentiality to the detriment of disclosure by its
formal inclusion in the Model Code. Thus, the Model Code continues
and even expands the Canons' enchantment with the ethical obliga-
tion of confidentiality.
In 1983, the ABA voted to replace the Model Code with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.39 Much of the debate sur-
rounding the adoption of the Model Rules revolved around proposals
to expand and contract disclosure obligations. In the end the
proponents of nondisclosure were victorious. The final draft
significantly cut back on the discretion that the Model Code gave a
lawyer to disclose future client wrongdoing.
The Model Rules did away with the distinction between confi-
dences and secrets and even strengthened the ethical obligation of
confidentiality by adopting a more encompassing prohibition. Model
Rule 1.6 provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client."40 Reflecting an increased concern for the
protection of client communications, Model Rule 1.6 cut back
significantly on the disclosure previously allowed by DR 4-101 by
eliminating the discretion to disclose future economic crimes. While
the Model Rules permitted the disclosure of client fraud, the
circumstances under which it was allowed were far more restrictive
36. Id. DR 7-102(B)(1).
37. Id.
38. Id. The exclusion was not included in the original draft adopted in 1969 by the
ABA. It has been suggested that the drafters did not appreciate that disclosure pursuant
to the authority of DR 7-102(B) would be interpreted as a limited exception to DR 4-101's
general norm of confidentiality. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
668-70 (1986). The exclusion was added in 1974, but not all states adopted it. Id. at 670.
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT vii-viii (1995) (stating that the
Model Rules were drafted after a determination that amendment of the Model Code would
not achieve a comprehensive statement of the law governing the legal profession); Ted
Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 14 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 677 (1989).
40. Id. Rule 1.6.
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than those contemplated by the Model Code. Despite the increased
solicitude for the confidentiality of client communications that these
changes evidence, the drafters did not disturb the fee-collection or
self-defense exceptions. This inconsistency and the self-interest it
represented did not escape the critical attention of members of the
public and the bar.41 Since 1983, the ABA has unwaveringly
supported confidentiality, vigorously beating back all attempts to
liberalize the Model Rules' nondisclosure provisions.4 2
In short, my first recommendation to Ms. Hopewell-to seek
guidance in the text and the history of the codes of lawyer-con-
duct-is a professorial success.4 3 We have reached an unambiguous
41. E.g., Ted Gest, Guilty Secrets are Still Safe with Lawyers, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Feb. 21, 1983, at 84; Stephen Gillers, Lawyer's Silence: Wrong..., N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 1983, at A17; Lawyers for Hire for Anything?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1983, at A26. But
see Monroe H. Freedman,... Wrong? Silence Is Right, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1983, at A17
(advocating the importance of maintaining client confidences in order to ensure effective
legal counseling).
42. For example, in 1991, the ABA House of Delegates defeated a proposed
amendment that would have permitted disclosure "to rectify the consequences of a client's
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used."
See ABA, STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, No. 108B (1991). Despite the ABA's hostility toward
disclosure, many of the states have continued the Model Code's tradition of vesting a
lawyer with discretion to disclose future economic crimes. Some states have even gone so
far as to mandate disclosure. E.g., NJ. R. GEN. APPLICATION pt. I app., RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b), reprinted in NEW JERSEY RULES OF COURT:
STATE AND FEDERAL 124 (1995); see generally THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTOUNDA, 1995 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 132-38
(1995). Ironically, the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
been more sympathetic to disclosure, but always in circumstances unrelated to Ms.
Hopewell's dilemma. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 92-366 (1992); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 93-375 (1993); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-376 (1993). But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 94-380 (1994) (finding no exceptions to the Model Rule regarding confidentiality for
lawyers representing a fiduciary).
43. Characterizing the search through text and history as my "first" recommendation
is not entirely accurate. I would have initially urged Ms. Hopewell: (1) to explore the
possibility of alternative legal action short of disclosure that might simultaneously protect
her client and avoid Mr. Smith's execution; and (2) to consult again with Mr. Jones
concerning his commitment to nondisclosure. I have been unable to divine a satisfactory
alternative. Some of Mr. Jone's remarks in their last meeting suggest that he has not
entirely foreclosed the possibility, for example, "he [Smith] doesn't deserve to die. It's not
right .... If I can get a deal out of this and it helps Frank too, fine. But don't use my
name, not yet." (emphasis added). Mr. Jones is a moral agent and may not escape his
ethical responsibility by attempting to transfer it to his lawyer, mental health therapist, or
clergyperson.
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and consistent resolution of a difficult issue of professional responsi-
bility. It makes no difference whether her inquiry is filtered through
the prism of the attorney-client privilege or that of the ethical
obligation of confidentiality; whether it is analyzed historically under
the Canons or the Model Code; or whether it is examined newly
under the Model Rules. The answer is the same: Ms. Hopewell may
not disclose her client's communication over his objection not even to
save the life of an innocent man.'
My intellectual satisfaction is short-lived, however. Even before
Ms. Hopewell can comment on my professional astuteness, my profes-
sorial and personal voices both shout out in unison, "But wait a
minute. Are you endorsing the proposition that the application of
black-letter principles ends all analysis? Aren't you always telling
Of course, Ms. Hopewell's advocacy of disclosure or-the more likely scenario-her
manipulation of Mr. Jones, raises its own set of moral issues. Mr. Jones's confession is
likely to insure a life sentence, perhaps even a capital sentence. It is difficult to
characterize such a result as being in her client's best legal interest. While a lawyer is free
to refer to "moral, economic, social and political factors" in giving a client advice, is Ms.
Hopewell providing the kind of independent professional judgment that a criminal
defendant has a right to expect from his lawyer? See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 2.1 & cmt. (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-8 (1969). In the end, Ms. Hopewell's conscience may be troubled more than her client's,
because he has so much more to lose.
44. A panel of prominent judges, lawyers, journalists, and ethicists discussed a
hypothetical almost identical to the Symposium's in To Defend a Killer, an episode in the
distinguished public television series, Ethics in America. James W. Neal, a celebrated
member of the criminal defense bar, opined with obvious deep personal conviction:
[M]y sole duty at that point in life is to stand beside the man accused of the
crime because, believe me, you can be the most popular man in the world, but
once you're accused of a crime, there's only one man who will stand up with you
and that is your defense counsel. He's the only person in the world who tries
to help you ... [B]efore I took that case, I had to agree that I would do
anything ethical to defend that man.
When asked if "anything ethical" included allowing an innocent man to be executed, he
replied, "[a]bsolutely... people die every day. It may sound harsh, but we have values
to serve." LISA H. NEWTON, ETHICS IN AMERICA: STUDY GUIDE 75 (1989).
Not all thoughtful commentators agree with Mr. Neal's conclusion. As Professor
(now Judge) Noonan has observed:
A lawyer should not impose his conscience on his client; neither can he accept
his client's decision and remain entirely free from all moral responsibility, subject
only to the restraints of the criminal law. The framework of the adversary
system provides only the first set of guidelines for a lawyer's conduct. He is also
a human being and cannot submerge his humanity by playing a technician's role
.... [T]he lawyer must act with regard for the requirements of the adversary
system and with concern for his standards as a human person, as well as with
regard for the requirement of the society which the system serves.
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1966).
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your students that if legal judgment involves nothing more than the
application of text to facts, an interactive computer program will solve
their clients' problems as well as they will?" Moreover, I can
distinctly hear the whisperings of my conscience over their shouting.
It is most firmly reminding me that obedience to professional role
cannot excuse moral imperatives.
III. THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT: AN INQUIRY
In counseling Ms. Hopewell, I would quickly move from text and
history to "core values," still seeking in my professorial quest, either
confirmation or disproof of her ethical obligation of confidentiality.
After all, as every good lawyer knows, the genius of the common law
was its ability to adapt to new situations and even the Supreme Court
has resorted to interpretations reflecting the "spirit" of a statute when
enforcing its "letter" would yield a nonsensical result or one inconsis-
tent with the legislature's intent.' Thus, our conversation would
turn away from text to policy....
While bar leaders and scholars have continuously and heatedly
debated the wisdom of testimonial and nontestimonial confidentiality,
there is remarkable agreement about the core values that animate the
debate. Those who advocate an absolute or near-absolute ban on the
disclosure of client communications invoke two complementary sets
of values: those that enrich the -individual attorney-client relation-
ship-such as autonomy and privacy-and those that enrich the legal
system and society in general-such as the securing of a more law-
abiding population.
The arguments for autonomy and privacy are fairly straightfor-
ward. There is a distinguished tradition in western philosophy
enshrining autonomy as a fundamental right of all human beings.
This right is critically threatened by the increasing imbalance in power
between the state and the individual or between private enterprises
and the individual. Almost all commercial relationships and many
personal ones are subject to regulation by the state, for example, the
licensing of businesses and the licensing of marriages; private
enterprises routinely intrude into decisions formerly considered a
matter of individual choice, for example, health care.
These changes lead to the inescapable conclusion that in many
important areas of life the substantive and procedural complexity of
45. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the law make the exercise of informed autonomy in decision-making
and action virtually impossible for individuals who lack legal training.
Viewed from this perspective, confidentiality becomes an indispens-
able precondition. Autonomy can be preserved only if clients confide
freely and without reservation in their lawyers.
Furthermore, the interactive process of lawyer-client communica-
tions frequently requires a client to share deeply personal information,
facts that the client ordinarily considers "private" and jealously guards
from disclosure. Privacy is thus inextricably linked to autonomy and
confidentiality. Without an assurance of confidentiality, a client Will
not jeopardize the privacy of intimate details. The nondisclosure will
hobble the lawyer's advice, ultimately corrupting the client's autono-
my.
Finally, it is sometimes argued that confidentiality promotes
virtuous conduct by lawyers, especially loyalty. In entering into a
lawyer-client relationship, lawyers assume the persona of the ultimate
professional "friend." 6  Friendship is impossible without loyal-
ty-witness the common pejorative designation, a "fickle friend."
Loyalty demands that the lawyer stick through the thick-and-thin of
the attorney-client relationship despite profound reservations about
the wisdom or the justice of the client's cause or strategy. Thus, in
the end, the lawyer's virtue-loyalty-is linked to the client's
rights-autonomy and privacy.
Confidentiality does more than enhance the individual attorney-
client relationship, however. Its proponents also advance a utilitarian
justification. Based on arguments very similar to those discussed in
the preceding paragraphs, they contend that confidentiality improves
the quality of legal advice that lawyers give clients. Improved legal
advice leads to more just verdicts and settlements and to more fair
transactions, thus benefitting society as a whole.
The most obvious difficulty with the core-values approach,
however, is that the legal profession has never sworn absolute fidelity
46. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE Li. 1060 (1976). For a contrary perspective, see William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis.
L. REv. 30, 108-09; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues,
5 HuM. RTs. Q. 1 (1975-1976). Proponents of client autonomy do not dismiss lawyer
autonomy. For example, they would not force a lawyer to become a professional friend
to a client whose personal, political, or economic views the lawyer regarded as repulsive.
In their view it is the lawyer's acceptance of an engagement that triggers the obligation of
total and undivided commitment.
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to them. Although there is a dedicated minority holding the contrary
view, an overwhelming majority of the members of the judiciary, the
legal academy, and the organized bar subordinate these values to the
proper and fair functioning of the criminal and civil justice systems.
They draw the line at the knowing use of client perjury and false
evidence.47 In such instances the administration of justice trumps
autonomy and loyalty. Less noble and even more firmly established
is the exception that permits disclosure to the extent necessary to
collect a lawyer's fee or to defend against an accusation of wrongdo-
ing.
48
The leading scholars, including the principal reporter for the
Restatement who drafted Illustration 4, refuse to exalt confidentiality
to the detriment of human life. Professor Wolfram abhors "the logic
of the privilege" and denounces its "moral calculus."'49 Even
Professor Monroe Freedman, the nation's most prominent and ardent
defender of strict confidentiality, declines to defend it in these
circumstances.
5 °
Another and even more significant difficulty with the core-values
approach is the paucity of empirical data demonstrating that a
guarantee of confidentiality is an essential precondition to the "full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients [that is
necessary to] promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice."5 1 The vigorous theoretical debate
about the relative weight of the pro-confidentiality values-autonomy,
privacy, loyalty, and the securing of a more law-abiding society-and
the pro-disclosure values-greater truth-finding, especially in
litigation-is conducted at great length within the professional
responsibility community. However, only intuition supports the
fundamental assertion upon which the attorney-client privilege and
ethical obligation of confidentiality rest. Empirical data are virtually
nonexistent.
47. E.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376 (1993); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).
48. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1995).
49. Wolfram, supra note 21, at 20.
50. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 103 (1990).
51. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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Even more disturbing is that the few and admittedly flawed
studies" that do exist suggest that lawyers and clients both misunder-
stand the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty of confidential-
ity. Both believe that they permit significantly more disclosure than
actually allowed. If the studies' conclusions are correct, they almost
certainly undermine the rights-based and utilitarian justifications
discussed earlier. Clients have regularly engaged in "full and frank
disclosure," thinking their communications were subject to less
protection than the attorney-client privilege and ethics codes
promised. Lawyers have regularly counseled clients, assuming less
protection for the communications. Furthermore, mathematical
models based on decision theory challenge the justifications as well.
Professors Kaplow and Shavell have raised serious questions about
their validity. 3
Thus, Ms. Hopewell and I will ruminate, growing increasingly
uncomfortable about the fit between the professional standards of
confidentiality and the assumptions upon which they rest. Our
musings may even turn to other legal observations that once
examined will undermine our already shaky confidence in the
standards' worth. What comfort can we take from the fact that the
law of agency from which the ethical obligation of confidentiality is
derived permits disclosure of a principal's wrongdoing to prevent
harm to a third party?54 Or that a serious question exists about the
constitutionality of absolute nondisclosure prohibitions, when they are
applied to prevent a lawyer from testifying that a client has admitted
the commission of a crime for which another person has been
charged?55 Or that other countries whose legal systems evidence a
similar solicitude for the protection of lawyer-client communications
52. Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 352 (1988);
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications
for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1261 (1962).
53. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1989); Steven
Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to Obtain Advice, Its Social
Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUDIES 123 (1988).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1957); see also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. d (1939) (stating "a privilege to disclose may also be
given by the law, independently of the other's consent, in order to promote some public
interest").
55. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality
Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601 (1989).
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would release Ms. Hopewell from that obligation under the circum-
stances described in the hypothetical?56
IV. CONCLUSION
What conclusion will Ms. Hopewell and I reach in the end? To
the extent that she is morally committed to preventing the execution
of an innocent man it will not be difficult to justify her decision.
Despite the black-letter text of the Code of Professional Responsibili-
ty, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Restatement of
the Law of Lawyering, a general consensus exists among the members
of the practicing bar and the academic community that permits
disclosure in the extreme circumstances contemplated by the
hypothetical. Furthermore, regulatory officials are likely to exercise
their discretion and not sanction Ms. Hopewell severely or at all.
There is no reason to assume that they would not be sympathetic to
her extreme predicament. There is every reason to assume that they
would be sensitive to the public outcry certain to follow bar discipline.
The prospect I find far more unsettling to contemplate is Ms.
Hopewell's possible rejection of disclosure. What happens if her
professional and personal value system gives greater weight to
confidentiality? What if she is morally comfortable with the "lawyer's
role" and with the course of conduct proscribed by the black-letter
texts? In this event, I am left to my own moral musings and must
decide whether to betray the confidences of both Ms. Hopewell and
Mr. Jones. Betraying Ms. Hopewell seems particularly perfidious.
Unlike her client, she is morally innocent of any wrongdoing. She has
responded to his shocking communication in a highly restrained
fashion. Rather than relying on her personal intuition or interpreta-
tion of the various codes of ethics she has sought guidance from
someone possessing an expertise greater than her own in professional
responsibility. She has no reason to suspect that this person might
betray her confidence. Mr. Jones, in contrast, had every reason to
worry about the probability of betrayal before speaking to Ms.
Hopewell. In light of the horrific consequences flowing directly from
nondisclosure, he certainly must have acknowledged to himself that
the argument for disclosure was far more compelling in this particular
instance than in most others. Of course, to the extent he surmised
56. See A. CROSS, EVIDENCE 398-400 (6th ed. 1985) (analyzing the application of the
attorney-client privilege in Great Britain).
June 1996] 1627
1628 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1611
correctly that Ms. Hopewell would keep his trust, my conduct is
especially hurtful.
In the end, I am prepared to betray each of them. To ease my
pain I will invoke two well revered philosophical doctrines: necessity
and civil disobedience. The doctrine of necessity protects an actor
who deliberately violates the law, if the purpose of such violation is
to avoid a "greater evil." Several of the themes about which I wrote
earlier in this Essay, describing the tension between the "letter of the
law" and the "spirit of the law" are also found in discussions of this
doctrine. It rests on two premises: first, that it is reasonable to
violate a rule if the evil caused by its observance would substantially
outweigh the evil caused by disobedience; and second, that it is unjust
to sanction an actor for objectively reasonable conduct." The
execution of an innocent man, in my view, is clearly a greater evil
than the betrayal of the confidences of Mr. Jones and Ms. Hopewell.
As for the doctrine of civil disobedience, its invocation is
somewhat unusual. Civil disobedience is traditionally associated with
acts that are "public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political.., done
with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of
government."58 Dissenters generally engage in civil disobedience to
protest the acts of the executive or legislative branch. Although civil
disobedience directed to the judicial branch is not unheard of; for
example, anti-slavery, anti-segregation and anti-abortion demonstra-
tions, I, however, have located no instances of civil disobedience
directed to the judicial branch in its capacity as the regulator of the
legal profession. I see no reason why the absence of precedent should
be fateful to my claim. My protest is "public" in that I will reveal the
protected confidences to the prosecutor's office, the court, and in all
likelihood, the media. It is "political" in that it challenges a govern-
ment decision-the adoption of a code of ethics prohibiting disclosure
of past crimes in all circumstances. It is "conscientious" in that it
springs from my moral conviction that the application of the ethical
obligation of confidentiality will result in an irreparable injury to an
innocent third party.59 Finally, it is being undertaken not merely to
57. Joel Feinberg, Civil Disobedience in the Modern World, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
121, 122 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 5th ed. 1995).
58. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 365 (1971).
59. The irreparable injury that Mr. Smith will suffer actually makes my decision to
reveal Ms. Hopewell's confidences easier than it would be otherwise. The dynamic of my
decisionmaking would undoubtedly be different if the court had sentenced Mr. Smith to
life imprisonment or a term of years. I confess to being unable to draw the line between
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save Mr. Smith, but also to show the horrific lengths to which a sound
principle can be stretched. If this undertaking is successful, it will act
as a catalyst triggering a policy change in the conception of the ethical
obligation. In invoking the distinguished tradition of civil disobedi-
ence, I draw confidence from the writing of Professor Martha Minow,
who has argued:
[T]he legal system itself needs people who are willing to
break the law for political reasons. . . . The legitimacy of
the system itself requires confrontation with disobedience
defended by individuals who view compliance as immoral or
by individuals seeking to persuade lawful officials to
change.6°
irreparable and acceptable injury with any precision in this context. My conscience
strongly argues that the conviction of an innocent defendant is so morally repulsive that
disclosure should trump the ethical rule of confidentiality under almost all circumstances.
60. Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social
Change, 52 HARV. L. REV. 723, 741 (1991).
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